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A Tribute to Thanassi: The Influence of Justinian on
American Common Law Property
Sally Brown Richardson*
“The civil law is beautiful” was a favorite saying of my colleague,
mentor, and friend A.N. “Thanassi” Yiannopoulos.1 When any perceived
“ugliness” of the common law reared its head in Louisiana, Thanassi was
quick to point it out.2 He tirelessly worked with the Louisiana State Law
Institute to update Louisiana laws while maintaining a strong devotion to
the state’s civilian heritage.3
When Louisiana law students today hear “the civil law is beautiful,” it
is usually in the context of the civil law being used as a shield from the
encroaching common law. It is worth remembering, though, that Thanassi’s
favorite phrase is also a sword. The civil law has long influenced the
common law, providing much of the foundation for common law doctrines.
One area in which this influence is particularly evident is the subject to
which Thanassi devoted much of his academic life: property law.
The civil law’s impact on American property law may not at first be
apparent. Civil law property and common law property are structured very
differently.4 How things are classified—be they, for example, movable or
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1. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, On the Bicentenary of the Louisiana Supreme
Court: Chronicle of the Creation of a Unique and Beautiful Legal Tradition, 74
LA. L. REV. 649, 651 (2014).
2. E.g., A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 13:16, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE (5th ed. 2015) [hereinafter YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY]; A.N.
YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES §§ 3:14, 3:33, in 3 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE (4th ed. 2013).
3. See Tyler G. Storms, Interview with Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos:
Louisiana’s Most Influential Jurist in Our Time, 64 LA. B.J. 24, 25–26 (2016);
Jeanne Louise Carriere, From Status to Person in Book I, Title 1 of the Civil Code,
73 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1264–66 (1999).
4. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 11:6; Yun-chien Chang &
Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2012).
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immovable, corporeal or incorporeal—is of great import in the civil law;5
the common law focuses far less on the classification of things.6 The civil
law has a firm, if not restrictive, concept of what constitutes a property
right, whereas in the common law, property rights are much more fluid.7
The civil law has a finite set of rights that are included in ownership,
namely the rights of usus, fructus, and abusus.8 The bundle of sticks that
may make up an individual’s interest in property in the common law is, it
seems, ever-morphing.9 The very notion that an individual can own
property is theoretically foreign to the common law, whereas ownership is
a bedrock of civil law property.10
Civil law property and common law property are unquestionably very
different, and yet, they are also very similar. Doctrinally, much of common
law property stems directly from the civil law and, specifically, from the
father of the civil law himself, Justinian.11 The Corpus Juris Civilis
provides the foundation for many doctrines recognized in American
property law today. By way of example, the rule of capture, as provided

5. J. INST. 2.1, 2.2; YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 2:7; W.W.
BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 185–86
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1963).
6. This is not to say the common law does not classify things; the common
law has obvious classifications, most notably real property versus personal property.
See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 7:6. The civil law’s codified effort
at describing how to classify things, however, is unknown in the common law.
7. JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT,
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 49 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006); Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, 3–6 (2000).
8. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 477 cmt. c (2018) (detailing how different civil
law jurisdictions codify ownership rights as rights of usus, fructus, and abusus).
9. See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle,
Property Customs, and the Emergence of New Property Forms, 100 IOWA L. REV.
2275, 2277–79 (2015).
10. GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 50–51; SJEF VAN ERP & BRAM AKKERMANS,
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON PROPERTY LAW 206 (Hart Pub. 2012).
11. For a discussion on Justinian’s impact on the civil law, see PETER STEIN,
ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 32–52 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999);
GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF ROME 190–95 (Routledge 2007).
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in the infamous case Pierson v. Post,12 sprang directly from Roman law,13
with the majority in Pierson expressly relying on the works of Justinian
and later civilian scholars, such as Grotius, Barbeyrac, and Puffendorf, to
determine whether the capturer becomes the owner of the property in
question.14
Similarly, American jurisprudence on the right of a riparian owner to
alluvion on his land can be traced to Roman law.15 Take, for example,
Middleton v. Pritchard.16 In Middleton, the plaintiff leased land from the
riparian owner for the purpose of felling the trees on the land.17 The
defendants cut down trees from the alluvial part of the plaintiff’s leased
property.18 The defendants alleged they had a right to remove trees on the
alluvion because, they argued, there can be no private ownership of alluvion.19
The Middleton court, siding with the plaintiff, found that “[a]ll alluvions
belong to the riparian proprietor, both by the common and civil law,” citing
Justinian for support.20 Similarly, in St. Clair County v. Lovingston,21 the
United States Supreme Court had to determine whether the riparian owner or
the county owned the alluvion that had formed along the Mississippi River.
12. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805). The facts of Pierson are well
known: Post was hunting a fox and hot on the fox’s trail when Pierson sprang into
action and fatally shot the fox. Id. at 175. The court was faced with the question of
who acquired the fox, the pursuer or the capturer. Just as Justinian would have
answered, the New York court in Pierson found that the capturer, Pierson, won the
fox and sent the pursuer, Post, home empty-handed. Id. at 179–80.
13. Roman law provided that one who captured water owned that water, even
when the capturing was done to the detriment of the capturer’s neighbor. DIG.
39.2.24.12 (Ulpian, Edict 81); 39.3.1.12 (Ulpian, Edict 53). Roman law took the
same position on wild animals: he who captures, owns. See J. INST. 2.1.13.
14. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 177–79. That the majority adopted Roman law
is not lost on the dissent. See id. at 180 (Livingston, J., dissenting). The dissent
even poked fun at the majority for relying on ancient scholars, stating “tempora
mutantur; and if men themselves change with the times, why should not laws also
undergo an alteration?” Id. at 181. Interestingly, the rule of capture as understood
in English common law similarly finds its roots in Roman law. See, e.g., Acton v.
Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843).
15. In his Institutes, Justinian stated that “[t]he law of all peoples makes yours
any alluvial accretion which a river adds to your land. An alluvial accretion is one
which goes on so gradually that you cannot tell at any one moment what is being
added.” J. INST. 2.1.20.
16. Middleton v. Pritchard, 3 Scam. 510, 522 n.4 (Ill. 1842).
17. Id. at 510.
18. Id. at 510–11.
19. Id. at 512.
20. Id. at 522 n.4. The plaintiff similarly relied on Justinian. See id. at 517.
21. St. Clair Cty. v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46 (1874).

1114

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

The Court, like in Middleton, relied on Roman law for its answer, stating
that “[t]he law in cases of alluvion is well settled. In the Institutes of
Justinian it is said: ‘Moreover, the alluvial soil added by a river to your
land becomes yours by the law of nations.’”22
Even issues concerning life estates—a property interest unknown to
the civil law—find their origins in Roman law. For example, the doctrine
of waste, as applied to life estates and understood in American property
law, comes from the English common law that was derived from the
Roman law of usufruct.23
Broad swaths of American property law find their roots in Roman law.
Servitudes, for example, “have been known since ancient times.”24 Roman
law has long been attributed as a major source for American property law
concerning servitudes.25 Similarly, adverse possession stems from Roman
22. Id. at 66 (citing J. INST. 2.1.20). The Lovingston Court went on to cite
French and Spanish law, which also were derived from Roman law. Id. at 66–67;
see also Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 130 F.2d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir.
1951) (relying on Roman law to determine alluvion ownership). There are even
instances in which state statutes concerning riparian ownership rights are
expressly drawn from Roman law. E.g., J.P. Furlong Entes., Inc. v. Sun Expl. &
Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 135–36 (N.D. 1988) (discussing the Roman heritage
for a North Dakota statute that assigns ownership rights to the riparian owner
when a river leaves its bed and forms a new channel).
23. See Sally Brown Richardson, Reframing Ameliorative Waste, 65 AM. J.
COMP. L. 335, 351–54 (2017) (demonstrating how Henry de Bracton relied on
Roman usufruct law to develop English waste law); see also First Nat’l Bank of
Mobile v. Wefel, 40 So. 2d 434, 437 (Ala. 1949) (relying in part on Dashwood v.
Magniac, [1891] 3 Ch 306, to determine whether felling trees was an act of waste);
Lee & Bradshaw v. Rogers, 108 S.E. 371, 374 (Ga. 1921) (same). The Dashwood
case used by some American courts is an English case that relied expressly and
exclusively on Roman law to determine that a life tenant may periodically fell
trees without committing waste. For a further discussion of Dashwood, see
Richardson, supra, at 354–55.
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES Introduction (AM.
LAW INST. 2000); see also Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New
Restatement of Property: Creation of Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 928, 929 n.8 (1988).
25. E.g., Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige Ch. 254, 256–57 (Chancery Court N.Y. 1832)
(using Roman predial servitude law to determine an issue concerning a servitude of
light); Duncan v. Cent. Pass. Ry. Co., 4 S.W. 228, 229 (App. Ct. Ky. 1887)
(analogizing to Roman predial servitudes to decide an issue pertaining to negative
easements); Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1177, 1185 n.36 (1982); Sally Brown Richardson, Nonuse and Easements:
Creating a Pliability Regime of Private Eminent Domain, 78 TENN. L. REV. 1, 22
n.142; Harry Upson Sims, Notes on Codifying Real Property Law in the United
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law.26 Scholars have credited Roman law with providing the underpinnings
for the modern system of copyright law.27 How the common law identifies
property as real versus personal also is attributed to Roman law.28
That Roman law is a source for American property law is not a novel
statement,29 but it is an important one, particularly as we remember a great
Louisiana property law scholar. As Thanassi always said, “the civil law is
beautiful,” and that beauty is something that has long been recognized,
even by the common law.
As Louisiana continues to revise the Louisiana Civil Code and other
state laws, those involved in the revision, including judges, legislators, and
academics, must remember the beauty of the civil law and protect that
beauty. Louisiana’s legal system operates at its best when the Louisiana
Civil Code and the Revised Statutes work hand in hand, providing coherent,

States, 36 HARV. L. REV. 987, 998 (1923); Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Idea of Mixed
Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 5, 27 (2003) (“[E]asements were in turn derived
from the Roman law of predial servitudes.”).
26. See United States v. Chavez, 175 U.S. 509, 523 (1899) (crediting Roman
law with supplying the concept of adverse possession that existed in Mexican
law); Sally Brown Richardson, Abandonment and Adverse Possession, 52 HOUS.
L. REV. 1385, 1393 (2015); Carol Necole Brown & Serena M. Williams,
Rethinking Adverse Possession: An Essay on Ownership and Possession, 60
SYRACUSE L. REV. 583, 584 (2010).
27. Russ VerSteeg, The Roman Law Roots of Copyright, 59 MD. L. REV. 522
(2000) (discussing how Roman law concepts of intangible property, the nature of
the public domain, and ownership rights provide the foundation for modern
copyright law); Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law:
Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
365, 369–70 (2004).
28. WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR
RELATION TO MODERN LAW 301–02 (Lawyers Co-operative Pub. Co. 1988).
29. E.g., Andrea B. Carroll, Examining A Comparative Law Myth: Two Hundred
Years of Riparian Misconception, 80 TUL. L. REV. 901 (2006) (discussing the civil
law roots for the rules regarding riparian surface access to non-navigable lakes);
Harbert Davenport & J.T. Canales, The Texas Law of Flowing Waters with Special
Reference to Irrigation from the Lower Rio Grande – Part One, 8 BAYLOR L. REV.
138, 157 (1956) (discussing Roman influence in American water law). See generally
Thomas J. McSweeney, Property Before Property: Romanizing the English Law of
Land, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1139 (2012) (discussing how English scholars, particularly
Bracton, used Roman law as the basis for understanding English property law);
Richard A. Epstein, The Modern Uses of Ancient Law, 48 S.C. L. REV. (1997)
(discussing how Roman law highlighted and answered numerous legal questions that
persist in modern society).

1116

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

interconnecting, ex ante rules to guide parties,30 just as Justinian did for
Roman law.31 Louisiana law is weakest when the Civil Code contradicts
itself32 or when the state’s legislation and jurisprudence act as adversaries
rather than partners.33 These weak points in Louisiana law can be prevented,
so long as those involved in revising and interpreting the law remember the
beauty that Thanassi always found in Louisiana’s civil law.34
30. Louisiana’s community property regime, for example, generally functions
as a coherent set of interconnected rules that guide spouses as to their property rights
vis-à-vis one another and with respect to third parties. See HARRIET S. DAGGETT,
POLICY QUESTIONS ON MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN LOUISIANA, in COMPARATIVE
STUDIES IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW 50, 52 (Jan P. Charmatz & Harriet S.
Daggett eds., 1977) (noting how Louisiana’s community property regime is “the
fairest, most thoughtfully designed plan for marital property law yet devised”).
Louisiana’s Civil Code articles on possession similarly create a coherent, organized
structure for parties to know, ex ante, their rights to property. See Martin E. Golden,
Note, Working with the New Civil Code Property Scheme: The 1982 Book III
Revision, 43 LA. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1983) (noting that the 1982 revision to the
articles on possession were a “great step forward” in terms of “language,
organization, and legislative technique”).
31. STEIN, supra note 11, at 33 (noting the orderly nature of the Corpus Juris
Civilis); see also BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 42–44
(Clarendon Press 1962) (discussing Justinian’s success with the Corpus Juris Civilis
but noting that a number of contradictions exist within the work).
32. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 568.2, editor’s note (2018) (critiquing
the right of a usufructuary to lease property beyond the term of the usufruct as it
conflicts with other provisions in the Civil Code and Mineral Code); id. art. 573,
editor’s note 1 (critiquing that the reference in Article 573(A)(1) to a legal usufruct
in Article 223 was not repealed when the legal usufruct in Article 223 was
legislatively removed). The lack of codification can also create havoc for Louisiana
law. E.g., Spencer C. Sinclair, The Louisiana Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine:
Codified Confusion, 89 TUL. L. REV. 517 (2014) (discussing the confusion caused
in the good faith purchaser doctrine with the repeal of Civil Code article 520).
33. The decades-long back-and-forth between courts and scholars regarding
Civil Code article 466 is perhaps the best example of how conflicting jurisprudence
and legislation can be problematic in Louisiana law. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY,
supra note 2, § 7:40 (providing a history of the debate on how Article 466 should be
interpreted); Amy Allums, Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co.: How a
Small Hotel Made a Big Difference in the Component Part Concept, 74 TUL. L. REV.
1543, 1555 (noting the need to redraft Article 466 if the court’s holding in Prytania
Park was to be applied in the future without leading to unjust results).
34. See Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic
or Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century?, 63 LA. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2002) (noting
that the challenge facing Louisiana is how to modernize the Civil Code to deal with
contemporary technology without “discarding the classic ideology and methodology
which is characteristic of our proud civil law heritage”).
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In honoring that beauty, however, we cannot fear the common law.
Much of the common law is derived directly from the civil law. Although
the civil law and common law systems may have notable differences, they
also have striking similarities. As Louisiana law continues to modernize,
we civilians would be remiss if we ignore the common law simply because
it is the common law. We must instead remember that many of the
common law’s roots are intertwined with our own in Roman legal history.

Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos

